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ABSTRACT
This paper discusses the differences between orthodox and
heterodox economics as well as between American and British
Global Political Economy (GPE). It is found that the main
differences within both disciplines are related to meta-theoretical
premises. However, meta-theory turns out to be also a uniting
factor between disciplines. Orthodox economics and American
GPE mostly share positivist meta-theory, while heterodox
economics and British GPE are largely based on critical realist
meta-theory. Instead of building bridges within disciplines, it is
suggested that it would be more feasible to combine some parts
of orthodox economics with American GPE and some parts of
heterodox economics with British GPE. This paper also discusses
the role of mathematics in economics, critically assessing Tony






American GPE; British GPE
1. Introduction
According to Cohen (2007a, 2008), Global Political Economy (GPE; also known as Inter-
national Political Economy, IPE) emerged in the 1960s as a synthesis of international econ-
omics and International Relations (IR). Since then the discipline has split into American and
British GPE. Within economics there is a similar division and the discipline has been sep-
arated into orthodox economics (i.e. neoclassical economics or mainstream economics)
and heterodox economics. Since the 1970s, orthodox economics has consolidated its pos-
ition as the dominant tradition within economics, while the heterodox traditions, such as
post-Keynesian, Marxian or Austrian economics, have become increasingly marginalized.
The dominant position of orthodox economics has remained unchallenged even in the
aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2007–2008, which lead to questions about the
validity of many of its claims.
In this paper, I compare the meta-theoretical commitments of economics and GPE.
Specifically, I show that:
(a) American GPE is largely compatible with orthodox economics, and both can be mostly
rooted in positivism.
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(b) British GPE is largely compatible with heterodox economics, and both can be mostly
rooted in critical realism.
Based on these characteristics of economics and GPE, I argue that combining some parts
of orthodox economics with American GPE may prove to be more feasible than building
bridges between orthodox and heterodox economics. Similarly, combining some parts of
heterodox economics with British GPE may be more fruitful than trying to merge American
and British GPE.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces positivist and critical realist
meta-theory. Section 3 explores the differences between orthodox and heterodox econ-
omics. Section 4 discusses the role of mathematics in economics, critically assessing the
claim of Lawson (1997, 2013) that economics should entirely eschew mathematics and
arguing that – when the meta-theoretical assumptions of two positions are incommensur-
able – it is challenging, if not impossible, to combine them. Section 5 clarifies the differ-
ences between American and British GPE. Section 6 tries to reconcile orthodox
economics with American GPE as well as heterodox economics with British GPE. I
provide a conclusion to the paper in Section 7.
2. Positivist and critical realist meta-theory
This section describes the philosophical meta-theories of positivism and critical realism.
Positivism holds that all valid knowledge is derived knowledge. That is, knowledge can
be derived from sensory experience through reason and logic. Positivism is based on
empiricism; it requires that researchers must test derived assertions against empirical evi-
dence. Logical positivism is a variant of positivism; it combines empiricism and rationalism.
In addition to maintaining that observational evidence is necessary for knowledge, logical
positivism admits that knowledge includes a component that is not derived from obser-
vation. When I refer to positivism, I refer to this variant of positivism.
One implication of positivist meta-theory is that the social world – in addition to the
natural world – operates according to general laws. These laws take the form of cau-
sally related constant conjunctions. The role of the researcher is to discover these con-
stant conjunctions, usually reported as statistical correlations. The great contribution of
Bhaskar (1979) was to see causality in a broader sense. According to Bhaskar (1979),
causality is not related to events and their conjunctions (the actual) but rather to struc-
tures and mechanisms (the real) which are not necessarily directly observable. Thus,
regularities are neither sufficient nor necessary conditions for causes even when
observed in social sciences; and regularities of events should only be seen as ten-
dencies. Furthermore, it is only in closed systems – as one might achieve when study-
ing a natural system in a laboratory – that one is able to manipulate the situation to
bring about a constant conjunction of events. According to Bhaskar (1979), the social
world can only be subject to local closures that are temporally and spatially contingent.
Therefore, while positivism’s focus on constant conjunctions allows it to be relevant to
the natural sciences, in which closed systems can be constructed, it cannot be applied
to the social sciences. Bhaskar (1979) therefore offered critical realism – with its broader
conception of causality – as the most appropriate meta-theory for social sciences. Criti-
cal realism avoids closed system explanations based on constant conjunctions and,
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instead, advocates open system analysis in which outcomes are assumed to be geo-his-
torically contingent.
Unlike positivists, Bhaskar (1979) also made a difference between explanation and pre-
diction. He argued that a social event can be explained but it could not have been pre-
dicted due to the openness of the social system. To illustrate his point – as an example
of unpredictable explanation – Bhaskar (1979) gave evolution, which cannot predict
what forms of life will develop in the future, but which can explain how any existing
form of life developed.
Another difference between positivism and critical realism is that the latter maintains
that there is a sharp distinction between facts and values; while the former maintains
that facts and values are related. Consequently, critical realists, contra positivists, assert
that we can use facts to influence values. Therefore, although critical realism is similar
to positivism in that neither make substantive claims nor advance policy implications, it
is nevertheless unlike positivism in that it assumes that the substantive claims achieved
through research can lead to policy implications – because facts can lead to values. Never-
theless, in practice, positivist research is used to influence policy decisions, but this contra-
dicts its basic assumptions.
3. Orthodox and heterodox economics
Orthodox economics is also known as neoclassical economics or mainstream economics
(in this paper I will use the term orthodox economics). Heterodox economics, then,
refers to all other approaches. Although these concepts are regularly used in the literature,
their definitions are varied, and range from a focus on substance to a focus on meta-
theory. I will argue that it is more feasible to use substantive rather than meta-theoretical
criteria to separate heterodox economics from orthodox economics.
In contrast to my position, Lawson (2013) prefers the use of meta-theoretical criteria.
Following Veblen, Lawson (2013) defines orthodox economics as an enduring reliance
upon formal mathematical modelling, particularly mathematical deductivism. Deductivism
presupposes that correlations or event regularities exist and they can and should be
spotted. Lawson (2013) argues that some parts of heterodox economics share this same
deductivistic approach and, thus, could instead be classified as orthodox economics. To
the contrary, I argue that Lawson’s definition is too simplistic. If orthodox economics is
defined along these lines, for instance, some Marxists economists would be counted as
orthodox. I assume that this would be unacceptable both for most orthodox and hetero-
dox economists.
In other words, if Lawson’s definition is accepted, the whole term becomes meaning-
less. It suggests that the label ‘orthodox economics’ could be dropped altogether,
perhaps replaced by the terms ‘mathematical’ or ‘quantitative’ economics. Quantitative
economics could then include both orthodox economics and the mathematical parts of
heterodox economics; and the remaining parts of heterodox economics could then be
called non-mathematical or qualitative economics. While Lawson’s (2013) critique of math-
ematical economics has its merits, his conclusion that we should define all mathematical
economics as orthodox economics results in obscuring important differences.
Therefore, I defend the position that orthodox and heterodox economics should be
defined according to their substance, not their meta-theoretical commitments. In the
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beginning of the nineteenth century, Simonde de Sismondi introduced the distinction
between orthodox and heterodox economic theories using confidence in laissez faire pol-
icies as the basis of his classification. More recently, methodological features have been
used to distinguish orthodox economics from heterodox economics. For instance, Eliassen,
Hauge, and Rajic (2015) argue that disagreements between orthodox and heterodox econ-
omists are mainly methodological – not ideological or political – and that therefore ortho-
dox economics is not necessarily inherently orientated towards the free-market. I agree
with Eliassen et al. (2015) that orthodox economics can tolerate a wide range of
different conclusions, but that it does not tolerate methodological deviations. Becker
(1976) argued that the defining features of orthodox economics are maximizing behav-
iour, market equilibrium and stable preferences. Milonakis and Fine (2009) define orthodox
economics by its technical apparatus (utility and production functions) and technical archi-
tecture (optimization, efficiency and equilibrium); and that it is in this way that orthodox
economics has become ahistorical and asocial.
In my view, the best definition is given by Arnsperger and Varoufakis (2006). Follow-
ing similar lines as above, Arnsperger and Varoufakis (2006) define orthodox economics
according to methodology (which they call meta-axioms): methodological individualism,
methodological instrumentalism and methodological equilibration. Methodological indi-
vidualism maintains that all explanations should be built on the behaviour of the indi-
vidual agent. Methodological instrumentalism insists that all behaviour should be
understood as preference-satisfaction maximization. Methodological equilibration
builds on analytically discovered equilibrium and stability analysis to study whether
the discovered equilibrium can be attained. I believe that the definition given by Arn-
sperger and Varoufakis is the most appropriate because it avoids the pitfall of defining
orthodox economics in terms of outdated conceptions. According to Arnsperger and
Varoufakis (2006), for instance, perfect rationality and market clearing are features
often present in orthodox economics but they are not necessarily a defining feature
of it. They argue that, as long as critics of orthodox economics define their subject
of critique incorrectly, then their criticism is bound to fail or at least to be unheard.
Keen (2015) is slightly more cautious. He argues that orthodox economists can, in
some rare cases, drop one or more of the meta-axioms of Arnsperger and Varoufakis,
but never all. However, those studies are never integrated into the core of orthodox
economics.
Even if orthodox economics is not uniquely defined as being based on mathematical
methods, it seems fairly uncontroversial to assert that, nevertheless, such methods are
an essential feature of it. Rational choice and game theory are the methodological work-
horses of practically all orthodox economists. Although I do not agree with Lawson’s
(2013) mathematically based distinction between orthodox and heterodox economics, I
completely share his view that especially orthodox economics has become fixated on
mathematical analysis.
Critical realists are generally cautious of the use of mathematics in social sciences –
including economics and GPE. Arestis, Brown, and Sawyer (2002), however, argue that
the notion that critical realism should be anti-mathematical, rather than simply cautious
towards mathematics, has arisen only through Lawson (1997). They point out that critical
realism is, after all, based on epistemological relativism and, thus, no method should be
precluded beforehand.
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Lawson seems to be too eager to rush into epistemological questions. Even though
Lawson (2013) argues, in line with Veblen, that economics should first and foremost con-
centrate on the ontological nature of society and only then on appropriate methods, he
seems to assume that certain orthodox economists – but also certain heterodox econom-
ists – have skipped the former and moved directly to the latter. He assumes that the onto-
logical nature of any economic research subject must always preclude mathematical
methods. Such a bold claim seems to question the epistemological relativism associated
to critical realism. In fact, Lawson seems to be an epistemological absolutist at least when it
comes to mathematics in economics.
Furthermore, Keen (2015) points out that Lawson seems to neglect the possibility that
mathematical methods would indeed prove to be an appropriate way to acquire knowl-
edge after ontological inquiry. In my view, mathematics has a certain but limited place
in economics. For instance, stock-flow consistent modelling, which is popular nowadays
within post-Keynesian economics, begins from the ontological premise that, by definition,
all financial assets must have a liability as their counterpart. Similarly, all financial flows
must come from and go to somewhere. From these starting points, one can build math-
ematical identities and make conjunctions. Nevertheless, it must be stated that, although
the financial system is a closed system, it does not automatically follow that it exhibits
event regularities or law-like patterns.
Additionally, there seems to be some ambivalence in Lawson’s work. While he was one
of the first to comprehensively discuss the relationship between critical realism and econ-
omics and was of the opinion that economics should abandon mathematical methods
(Lawson 1997); he later (Lawson 1999) admitted that accepting critical realism as an under-
lying meta-theory does not preclude formalistic methods. Specifically, he (1999) argued
that post-Keynesian economists admit that the world is generally open but that it can
be subject to local closures; and that local closures can warrant the use of mathematical
methods. The problem is, according to Lawson (1999), a priori commitment to closed
systems which is typical of orthodox economics but not of post-Keynesian economics.
Recently, however, Lawson (2013) changed again his mind and argued that economics
– whether orthodox or otherwise – should get rid of all mathematical methods. Thus,
Lawson has not been perfectly consistent with his demand that economics should
abandon mathematical methods.
Fine (2015) criticizes Lawson’s (2013) suggestion that by overemphasizing mathemat-
ical deductivism one can render substantive content arbitrary or amenable to other pur-
poses. Fine (2015) also claims that Lawson intentionally misrepresents heterodox
economics in order to promote his social ontology. Keen (2015) challenges Lawson’s
(2013) position by arguing that orthodox economics is, in fact, not truly mathematical.
Keen (2011) argues that whenever mathematical logic conflicts with orthodox meta-
axioms, mathematics is abandoned in favour to preserve the core of orthodox economics.
Fine (2015) shares the same view. It could be asked that – should orthodox economists be
able to make the same points without mathematics –would this be acceptable to Lawson?
According to Weintraub (2002), it is not straightforward to declare economics as math-
ematical since what is meant by ‘mathematical analysis’ has changed over time. According
to Weintraub (2002), orthodox economics became mathematical in a particular way when
Debreu imported the concepts of ‘rigor’ and ‘proof’ frommathematics into orthodox econ-
omics in the middle of the twentieth century. Weintraub (2002) argued that since then
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orthodox theory has built on internal validity (logical consistency) instead of external val-
idity (empirical consistency), but nonetheless manages to fail even by its own standards.
Davidson (2003) argued that ignoring external validity is the reason orthodox econ-
omics has lost its connection with the real world. According to Davidson (2003), the econ-
omic reality is non-ergodic and, thus, requires different tools than orthodox economists
apply. Also, Dow (2003) advocated plurality of methodological tools which include but
are not limited to mathematics.
In addition, Keen (2015) questions Lawson’s (1997, 2013) view that mathematical econ-
omics is inevitably based on atomistic and closed social reality. According to Keen (2015),
any non-linear system is, by definition, not atomistic as it cannot be reduced to its constitu-
ent parts. In fact, Keen (2015) argues that non-linear systems are normally open and non-
ergodic and, thus, consistent with critical realism. Therefore, Keen (2015) argues that
Lawson’s critique applies only to linear mathematical models. Keen (2015) suggests that
particularly orthodox economics should not abandon mathematics but instead to catch
up with the progress in mathematics by applying non-linear models more widely.
Eliassen, Hauge, and Rajic (2015) do not suggest that economists should avoid math-
ematics but that they should also include a range of other tools. According to Eliassen,
Hauge, and Rajic (2015), relying solely on the mathematical methods of orthodox econ-
omics increases the chance of making mistakes. For instance, instead of efficient market
hypothesis had economists paid attention to Fisher’s (1932, 1933) debt-deflation theory
and Minsky’s (1986) financial instability hypothesis, they would have probably had a
better understanding of the global financial crash. Based on this Eliassen, Hauge, and
Rajic (2015) argue for more pluralistic teaching of economics. In sum, I share Lawson’s
view that orthodox economics in particular has become fixated on (a certain type of)
mathematical analysis. However, I disagree with Lawson that mathematical modelling
should be completely abandoned. Depending on the context and the research objective,
sometimes – although not always – mathematics is the appropriate approach to under-
stand economic reality.
Up to this point, in this section, I have discussed the different role played by mathemat-
ics in the orthodox and heterodox approaches to economics. I now turn to attempts to
reconcile the two approaches. Despite their differences, there have been attempts to
build bridges between them. In fact, some post-Keynesian ideas have already been incor-
porated into, and reformulated for, orthodox economics. Perhaps the best-known case is
Hicks’s (1937) reinterpretation of Keynes’s (1936) General Theory. More recently, endogen-
ous money has been incorporated into dynamic-stochastic general equilibrium models
(e.g. Woodford 2003). The importance of monetary sovereignty has been emphasized
by De Grauwe (2012). Furthermore, the possibility of a prolonged recession due to insuffi-
cient aggregate demand has been recognized by Summers (2014). Interestingly, orthodox
economists rarely acknowledge the precedence of post-Keynesian work and simply
present the ideas as novel and their own. Farmer (2017) is an exception. He explicitly con-
siders how to combine orthodox economics with post-Keynesian economics (although it
should be noted that the list of references hardly contains any post-Keynesian names).
Farmer (2017) proposes a ‘post-Keynesian general equilibrium’ framework to facilitate col-
laboration between orthodox and post-Keynesian economists.
As well as attempts to reconcile orthodox and heterodox economics, we also have
examples of some orthodox economists who have had the courage to abandon the
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orthodox framework and adopt a heterodox approach (at least occasionally). For instance,
distinguished orthodox economist Joseph Stiglitz (in Caiani et al. 2016) has been willing to
do research from a post-Keynesian starting point.
I have more sympathy with these latter economists who have abandoned attempts to
reconcile orthodox and heterodox economics. I think that such reconciliatory ambitions
are bound to fail because, despite some genuine convergence, significant differences
remain. In particular, the meta-theoretical assumptions of orthodox and heterodox econ-
omics are incommensurable. While orthodox economics builds mostly on positivism, het-
erodox economics is largely consistent with critical realism (see e.g. Lawson 1999; Lavoie
2015, 12–13). As a result, without significant concessions, building bridges between the
traditions seems challenging if not impossible.
4. American and British GPE
According to Cohen (2007a, 2008), GPE emerged as a new discipline in the 1960s as an
attempt to integrate international economics and IR; while Patomäki (2009) argues that
the history of GPE can be traced back to the marginalist revolution in economics in the
late nineteenth century. Regardless of when GPE emerged, since then GPE has evolved
to two different paths which Cohen (2007a, 2008) labels as American and British GPE.
This dichotomy is analogous to the dichotomy of orthodox and heterodox economics.
The description of American and British GPE below follows Cohen (2007a, 2008).
The ontology of the American school is state-centric. Thus, its adherents label the field
of study as IPE; they see it as a subfield of IR. Its epistemology is based on positivism and
empiricism and consequently, it is associated with formal deductive methods of analysis.
Contrastively, the ontology of the British school is more pluralistic. Instead of concen-
trating on states, its proponents emphasize the importance of various actors and, there-
fore, label the field as GPE. Their version of GPE is multidisciplinary and they see it as an
independent discipline from IR (they also prefer the termWorld Politics over IR). Their epis-
temology is normative and they build on qualitative methods.
Cohen’s dichotomic classification has been criticized for being inaccurate and insuffi-
cient. The geographical basis of Cohen’s classification has perhaps been the most
common criticism. For instance, Higgott and Watson (2007), Ravenhill (2007), Patomäki
(2009) and Leander (2009) argue that the geographical dichotomy is not accurate as
many scholars in the UK use American GPE and vice versa. Furthermore, Cohen’s classifi-
cation excludes the rest of the world even though GPE was never limited to the US and UK.
Cohen has defended his classification, saying that in his original works (Cohen 2007a,
2007b, 2008, 2009) he emphasized that the dichotomy is not based on geography, but
rather on method. He decided to label the opposing sides of the dichotomy as ‘American’
and ‘British’ because most main adherents are located in those areas (although exceptions
can always be found). In my opinion, Cohen could have used different labels, which may
have been a better reflection of the ontology and methodology of the two approaches,
but now that these labels have been established, changing them will only add to the
confusion.
More importantly, Cohen’s classification has been criticized by Leander (2009) who
argues that Cohen’s (2007a, 2008) intellectual history is insufficient as it sidesteps impor-
tant theoretical approaches such as constructivism and feminism. Both Leander (2009) and
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Patomäki (2009) argue for multiple intellectual histories which can account for various con-
temporary research agendas. Cohen, however, is not saying that his version should be
accepted as the only intellectual history. Equally well Cohen’s (2007a, 2008) version can
be one intellectual history among many others.
Despite the shortcomings of his dichotomous classification, Cohen (2007a, 2008)
suggests consolidating GPE by building bridges between American and British GPE. He
argues that American GPE could provide methodological rigour while British GPE could
have much to offer in terms of research agenda. Many, however, have questioned the
idea that American and British GPE can be synthesized. Higgott and Watson (2007) and
Ravenhill (2007) accused Cohen of favouring American GPE over British GPE. Cohen
(2007b) replied that, although he is inclined towards formal methods, he does not
favour American school over British school as there is much more to GPE than epistem-
ology. Cohen (2007b) argued that the British school is stronger in other areas. Patomäki
(2009), on the other hand, points out that Cohen is not practicing what he preaches.
According to Patomäki (2009), Cohen (2007a, 2008) is arguing for American formal
methods but uses British historical and interpretative methods himself.
According to Higgott and Watson (2007) and Ravenhill (2007), Cohen makes things
worse with the transatlantic dichotomy as, instead of reconciliation, it will lead to polariz-
ation. Cohen (2007b) points out that the dichotomy does not invoke Kuhn’s (1962) notion
of competing paradigms and that there are already many attempts to bridge the gap
between the two schools. Thus, according to Cohen (2007b), simply acknowledging the
differences between the American and British school does not necessarily lead to their
polarization and competition instead of reconciliation.
Most importantly, as Patomäki (2009) explains, American and British GPE are based on
different meta-theoretical premises, and therefore it seems doubtful that the two schools
could be synthesized. Leander (2009) supports dialogue between American and British
GPE but argues that this does not necessarily lead to a synthesis. According to Leander
(2009), the main obstacle to dialogue is not meta-theoretical but rather the willingness
to recognize the other as an equal partner; he suggests that mutual recognition might
be one solution. Nevertheless, by accepting that the dialogue does not necessarily to
lead to synthesis, Leander does not dismiss the idea that American and British GPE are fun-
damentally incompatible due to meta-theoretical differences.
Just as it is likely to be difficult to integrate orthodox and heterodox economics – since
they are based on different meta-theoretical premises – so it might prove to be difficult to
integrate American and British GPE. Reliance on positivism seems to be the shared factor
of American GPE and orthodox economics; while critical realism seems to be the uniting
force of British GPE and heterodox economics. Thus, it might prove to be more fruitful to
combine American GPE with orthodox economics and British GPE with heterodox econ-
omics. These possibilities are examined next.
5. Combining economics and GPE?
Having argued against the possibility of combining disciplines based on incommensurable
meta-theoretical assumptions, the logical next step is to consider how to combine two dis-
ciplines that have related content and commensurable meta-theoretical assumptions.
Specifically, we might ask how to build bridges between American GPE and orthodox
8 P. LAINÀ
economics, who largely share positivism as their underlying meta-theory; and British GPE
and heterodox economics, who largely share critical realism as their underlying meta-
theory.
On the one hand, it seems that American GPE and orthodox economics are easily com-
patible. In fact, there is already a subfield called political economy, which applies the tools
of economics to public policy, and which can therefore be conceived as a combination of
American GPE and orthodox economics. Furthermore, American GPE already draws signifi-
cantly from orthodox economics. For instance, neo-liberal institutionalist GPE accepts, and
regularly builds on, the Mundell–Fleming trilemma (an economy cannot simultaneously
maintain a fixed exchange rate, free capital movement and an independent monetary
policy) and international trade theories of orthodox economics. American GPE scholars
are therefore willing to build on positivist methods and reductionist theories of orthodox
economics. Perhaps the most significant difference is their research agendas. Orthodox
economists do not study power relations or countries’ economic policies which are of
great interest for American GPE scholars. Instead of how institutions emerge and
endure, orthodox economists might explain the reasons why institutions exist. Thus,
although limited by positivism, orthodox economics combined with American GPE may
be able to offer useful interdisciplinary perspectives.
On the other hand, previous interdisciplinary co-operation between American GPE and
orthodox economics could be characterized as economic imperialism rather than true col-
laboration. The analysis of geo-political power is typically reduced to an analysis of the
state as a rational agent maximizing an objective function. Based on this, cross-fertilization
between American GPE and orthodox economics may be regressive rather than
progressive.
In terms of combining British GPE and heterodox economics, we have already estab-
lished that critical realism is largely consistent with both. Therefore, critical realism
could provide the framework for integrating British GPE and heterodox economics.
While British GPE has been successful in analysing power relations, it lacks proper econ-
omic theory and its main method is to tell a historical story with no causal hypotheses
and no systematic use of empirical evidence (Patomäki 2003). This suggests that it
could benefit from joining with heterodox economics. The latter could provide it with
causal explanations and systematic empirical findings of various economic phenomena.
In addition, Patomäki (2003) suggests that both British GPE and heterodox economics
could introduce a number of concepts from critical realism – such as the concept of judg-
mental rationality – which would give them better grounds for avoiding relativism and
preferring certain explanations over others.
It could, however, be asked whether it is viable to build bridges between heterodox
economics and British GPE as there exists significant differences even within these tra-
ditions. For example, post-Keynesian and Austrian economics are based on quite
different foundations. Moreover, especially British GPE is not completely united in terms
of its meta-theoretical commitments. In particular, hermeneutical meta-theory has a
strong foothold. Thus, it would be an exaggeration to call British GPE as fully consistent
with critical realist meta-theory. Similarly, some heterodox economics schools of
thought can include hermeneutical or positivist elements although to a lesser extent.
However, the point is not to combine the whole heterodox economics edifice with
British GPE. Rather, as suggested above, some heterodox economics schools of thought
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could be combined with some British GPE schools of thought. Similarly, orthodox econ-
omics, which includes only a single school of thought, could be combined with some
American GPE schools of thought. Indeed, there are several interdisciplinary attempts to
build both on British GPE and heterodox economics. For instance, Patomäki (2003)
seems to use critical realism to combine neo-Gramscian GPE with post-Keynesian econ-
omics in his analysis of global financial markets. Neo-Gramscian GPE is combined with
post-Keynesian economics also in Patomäki (2008) which discusses the political
economy of global security. Kirshner (2014), on the other hand, combines realist GPE
with post-Keynesian economics to analyse the hegemonic role of the US.
Critical realism could also provide the means for other interesting interdisciplinary com-
binations. For instance, Marxist GPE could be combined with Marxist economics. Construc-
tivist GPE and behavioural economics might also prove out to be a fruitful mix.
Unfortunately, I am not aware of any attempts to find common ground on this basis.
Whether collaboration should lead only to interdisciplinary experiments or to full-scale
synthesis is an open question. In the former case, all schools of thought would continue
to exist separately, while in the latter case at least some of them would ultimately merge.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, I discussed the meta-theoretical premises of economics and GPE. I found that
orthodox economics and American GPE are mostly based on positivism, while heterodox
economics and British GPE are built largely on critical realism. Instead of building bridges
within economics or GPE, I suggested that it might prove to be more feasible to combine
some parts of orthodox economics with American GPE and some parts of heterodox econ-
omics with British GPE. Whether this collaboration – based on meta-theory – will lead
simply to interdisciplinary collaboration or to a more profound synthesis is a question
for debate.
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